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Abstract
This paper investigates the stakes of introducing proba-
bilistic approaches for the management of power system’s
security. In real-time operation, the aim is to arbitrate in
a rational way between preventive and corrective control,
while taking into account i) the prior probabilities of
contingencies, ii) the possible failure modes of corrective
control actions, iii) the socio-economic consequences of
service interruptions. This work is a first step towards the
construction of a globally coherent decision making frame-
work for security management from long-term system ex-
pansion, via mid-term asset management, towards short-
term operation planning and real-time operation.
Nomenclature
Indices:
b Index of corrective control behaviors.
c Index of contingencies.
d Index of demands.
g Index of generating units.
` Index of transmission lines.
n Index of nodes.
Sets:
Dn Set of demands connected at node n.
Gn Set of generating units connected at node n.
Nb Set of corrective control behaviors.
Nc Set of contingencies.
Nd Set of demands.
Ng Set of generating units.
N` Set of transmission lines.
Nn Set of nodes.
Parameters:
cg Marginal generation cost of generating unit g.
crg Marginal corrective re-dispatch cost of generating
unit g.
Pmaxg Capacity of generating unit g.
Pming Minimum stable generation of unit g.
P−g Ramp-down limit of generating unit g.
P+g Ramp-up limit of generating unit g.
∆P eg Emergency ramp-down limit of generating unit g.
wg Disconnection severity coefficient of generating
unit g.
P 0d Load of demand d.
vd Value of lost load of demand d.
fmax` Capacity of transmission line `.
X` Reactance of transmission line `.
βn,` Element of the flow incidence matrix, taking a
value of one if node n is the sending node of line
`, a value of minus one if node n is the receiving
node of line `, and a zero value otherwise.
pic Probability of occurrence of contingency c.
pib Probability of realization of corrective control be-
havior b.
smax Severity threshold.
aci Binary parameter taking a zero value if component
{i ∈ Ng ∪ N`} is unavailable under contingency
c ≥ 1.
τc Binary parameter taking a value of one if contin-
gency c ≥ 1 concerns the failure of a generating
unit.
M A large constant.
Continuous Variables:
P 0g Power output of generating unit g under the pre-
contingency state.
P cg Corrective control schedule of generating unit g
under contingency c ≥ 1.
Pˆ cg (b) Power output of generating unit g at the terminal
state following the occurrence of contingency c ≥
1, the realization of corrective control behavior b
and the application of emergency control actions.
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2f0` Power flowing through transmission line ` under
the pre-contingency state.
f c` (b) Power flowing through transmission line ` under
contingency c ≥ 1 and corrective control behavior
b.
fˆ c` (b) Power flowing through transmission line ` at the
terminal state following the occurrence of contin-
gency c ≥ 1, the realization of corrective control
behavior b and the application of emergency con-
trol actions.
Pˆ cd (b) Load of demand d at the terminal state following
the occurrence of contingency c ≥ 1, the real-
ization of corrective control behavior b and the
application of emergency control actions.
θ0n Voltage angle at node n under the pre-contingency
state.
θcn(b) Voltage angle at node n under contingency c ≥ 1
and corrective control behavior b.
θˆcn(b) Voltage angle at node n at the terminal state
following the occurrence of contingency c ≥ 1, the
realization of corrective control behavior b and the
application of emergency control actions.
δcn(b) Slackness on the power balance at node n under
contingency c ≥ 1 and corrective control behavior
b.
sc(b) Severity of the terminal state following the oc-
currence of contingency c ≥ 1, the realization of
corrective control behavior b and the application
of emergency control actions.
Note: All continuous variables are non-negative with the
exception of the line flow variables, voltage angle variables,
and slack variable δcn(b) .
Binary Variables:
λc`(b) Binary variable, taking a value of one if there is an
overload in transmission line ` under contingency
c ≥ 1 and corrective control behavior b ∈ Nb.
pc`(b) Binary variable, taking a value of one only if
the flow of transmission line ` is positive under
contingency c ≥ 1 and corrective control behavior
b ∈ Nb.
γc(b) Binary variable, taking a value of one if the severity
of the terminal state following the occurrence of
contingency c ≥ 1 and the realization of correc-
tive control behavior b ∈ Nb is greater than the
respective threshold.
ycg(b) Binary variable taking a value of one if generating
unit g has to be disconnected under contingency
c ≥ 1 and corrective control behavior b.
I. Introduction
In today’s power systems security management practice,
the N − 1 criterion is used (with slightly different in-
terpretations in different control areas) to express an
acceptable level of security. This fundamental criterion
is consistently considered throughout overlapping deci-
sion horizons, ranging from long-term system expansion,
via mid-term asset management, to short-term operation
planning and real-time operation.
The ageing of the power system infrastructure and the
increasing penetration of renewable and dispersed genera-
tion presently induce new threats to the system security.
At the same time, the potential incorporation of emerg-
ing smart grid technologies poses as a new opportunity.
Such developments call more and more for the explicit
consideration of uncertainties through the development
of alternative security criteria and more effective decision
making frameworks [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6].
The idea of framing power systems security management
in a probabilistic paradigm is appealing but not new. Since
the 1970’s, several proposals to formulate probabilistic
variants of the problem and to develop solutions via
tractable algorithmic approximations have been presented
(see, e.g. [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]). Yet, none of these pro-
posals has gained acceptance by TSOs and Regulators,
as the practical difficulties for using probabilistic methods
instead of the N−1 criterion are multifold: i) data quality
issues, ii) computational complexity limitations, iii) the
allocation of security provision and service interruption
costs among control areas and end-users, iv) methodolog-
ical limitations in the assessment of the social benefit of
moving away from the N − 1 criterion.
Since security management is a multi-stage/multi-actor
optimisation problem (covering the different time-horizons
from long-term to short-term and ranging over multiple
subsystems coupled horizontally or vertically) it is neces-
sary to be able to appraise (and then be able to adapt
to) any suggested change in the decision making strategy
adopted in any one of these sub-problems.
A. Proposal
In the present paper we focus on the latest decision
horizon, namely real-time operation. In this context, we in-
vestigate the stakes of introducing a probabilistic approach
to arbitrate between preventive and corrective control
alternatives.
Reliance on corrective control measures is inevitably grow-
ing in response to the aforementioned increasing stress
and uncertainty in power system security management.
Yet, as with every system component, the operation of
corrective control is also characterized by a certain degree
of uncertainty. The fact that corrective control may fail to
operate as anticipated implies that the use of this resource
does not fully nullify the possibility of realizing undesirable
3system states resulting in unacceptable service disruption
levels. Explicitly acknowledging this feature, we propose
to account not only for the operational cost of corrective
control but also for the societal costs arising from the
corrective control potential behavior modes.
To that end, we introduce a decision making approach
on the basis of the socio-economic cost induced by a
security management strategy. The socio-economic cost
of a security management strategy comprises both of
operational costs incurred by the TSO as well as of societal
costs associated with the potential service disruption to
the system users. In order to encapsulate the conceptual
difference between the former and the latter, we consider
the avoidance of potentially severe societal costs as an
integral task of power system security management. We
thus frame a probabilistic security management concern-
ing both economy and risk [12], through the following
interrelated objectives:
• Primary Objective: Avoid with a certain confidence
the potential realization of extremely severe societal
cost levels.
• Secondary Objective: Minimize the expectation of
the socio-economic costs of security under all credible
system states.
B. Paper Organization
We begin by presenting in section II the general form of
the problem in question and discussing the main modeling
issues that should be addressed. In the final part of
this section, we also introduce a set of approximations
adopted to develop a tractable algorithmic approach for
the purposes of this paper. Based on such approximations,
in section III we establish the detailed mathematical for-
mulation of the considered problem as a Mixed-Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) problem. In section IV, we
demonstrate the properties of this proposal through a
single-area academic test system and assess its effects on
a comparative basis, with respect to the well-known N-1
approach. In section V we consider an alternative set of
case studies concerning a system with two control areas.
We conclude in section VI by summarizing the key findings
of this work and discussing in detail the main challenges
toward the adoption of probablistic power system security
management practices.
II. Security management in real-time oper-
ation
In the present section we establish the general form of
the proposed probabilistic real-time security management
approach. Furthermore, we highlight the key modeling
challenges and introduce a set of approximations employed
in this paper for the sake of tractability.1
1For notational simplicity, but without loss in generality, we as-
sume that all uncertainties range over a finite number of possibilities.
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Fig. 1. Decision making stages and outcomes
A. Modelling the set of possible scenarios
Let us denote byNc the set of possible contingencies, by x0
the current operating state of an interconnected system, by
U0(x0) the space of possible preventive control actions ac-
cessible to a TSO operating one area of this system, and for
any pair (u0, c) ∈ U0(x0)×Nc by Uc(x0, u0, c) the space of
possible corrective control actions accessible to it. (Please,
preview Figure 1, before reading this section.)
We assume that the set of contingencies Nc describes in
a mutually exclusive and exhaustive way the events that
may happen during the next period of time T , and we
denote by pic ∈ [0; 1] their elementary probabilities, with∑
c∈Nc pic = 1.
2
The job of the TSO is to choose a joint decision strategy
u combining a preventive control choice u0 ∈ U0(x0) and
a set of corrective control choices {uc ∈ Uc(x0, u0, c)}c∈Nc .
We denote by U(x0) the space of all joint preventive-
corrective control strategies accessible to the TSO. Once
a joint strategy u ∈ U(x0) is chosen, the TSO applies its
preventive decision u0 and then waits for the potential
realization of a contingency c to apply the corresponding
corrective control uc.
Since corrective control is carried out under time pressure,
and since the system state may change in an unpredictable
way between the moment when a control action has
been selected and the moment it is applied, we do not
assume that the physical effect of the control strategy is
fully predictable [13]. Rather, we assume that for each
four-tuple (x0, u0, c, uc) there is a set of possible post-
contingency behaviors Nb(x0, u0, c, uc) that may occur; for
each possible behavior b ∈ Nb(x0, u0, c, uc) we denote by
pib(b|x0, u0, c, uc) ∈ [0; 1] its probability of occurrence, with∑
b∈Nb(x0,u0,c,uc) pib(b|x0, u0, c, uc) = 1.3
2The set Nc will thus in general contain also a pseudo-contingency
which corresponds to the case where no actual contingency is trig-
gered during the interval T .
3In the most simple case, the set Nb would be composed of only
two elements, one modelling perfect operation of corrective control,
and one modelling complete failure of corrective control.
4B. Security level induced by a decision strategy
We assume that the TSO can evaluate the impact of its
decision strategies on power system security by computing
a severity function s(x0, u0, c, uc, b) ∈ R+. Such a severity
function would be computed from the system dynamics
induced by the choice of the preventive control action u0,
the occurrence of the contingency c, the application of
the corrective control action uc, and the realization of the
post-contingency behavior b. This function would serve as
a measure of the societal cost of the service disruptions
realized by the end-users of its own control area.4
For a given x0 and a fixed strategy u, s is thus a random
variable. Let us define the two following quantities to
describe its dependence on the choice of u:5
Ps≤s′|x0,u(u)=
∑
c∈Nc
pic
∑
b∈Nb
pib(b|x0, u0, c, uc)1(s ≤ s′), (1)
which is the probability that the severity level s is smaller
or equal than the threshold s′, given the strategy u,
and
Es|x0,u(u) =
∑
c∈Nc
pic
∑
b∈Nb
pib(b|x0, u0, c, uc)s, (2)
which is the expected severity level induced by u.
C. Formulating the optimal decision making
problem
As already stated, we propose to formulate the task of the
TSO in real-time operation security management through
a combination of two objectives:
• Primary objective: avoid service interruptions of
large severity to a certain possible extent. We model
this objective by the choice of: i) a maximal severity
level smax to avoid and ii) a small risk  of not
being able to avoid it, i.e. in the form of the chance
constraint:
Ps≤smax|x0,u(u) ≥ 1− . (3)
• Secondary objective: minimise a cost-function
which combines the direct operating costs incurred
by the strategy and the societal costs measured by
the expectation of the severity function:
C(x0, u) = C0(x0, u0) +
∑
c∈Nc
picCc(x0, u0, c, uc)
+Es|x0,u(u). (4)
4We note that the computation of such a severity function may
require very detailed dynamic simulations to identify the joint phys-
ical effect of the TSO’s actions and post-contingency behaviors.
Moreover, in order to express the physical quantities characterizing
the resulting terminal state of the system in monetary terms, various
assumptions about the durations and costs of service interruptions
would be required.
5The operator 1(s ≤ s′) takes a value of one if s ≤ s′, and otherwise
takes a value of zero.
The real-time decision making problem (RTP) hence is
compactly expressed in the following way:6
RTP : Compute: u∗(x0) ∈ arg min
u
C(x0, u) (5)
subject to:
{
u ∈ U(x0),
Ps≤smax|x0,u(u) ≥ 1− .
(6)
D. Scalable approximation strategies
In large-scale power systems, the quantities C(x0, u) and
Ps≤smax|x0,u(u) used in our formulation can’t be calculated
exactly, even for a single “given” strategy u (and even if we
consider that Nc and Nb are finite sets). Hence the exact
solution of the RTP optimisation problem is certainly out
of reach in realistic conditions.
As a starting point in the direction of providing tractable
solutions to this problem, in the present paper we adopt
the following approximations:
(i) We express all network constraints under the DC
power flow model [14]. On this basis, we consider the
pre-contingency scheduling of the generating units as
the preventive control action available to the TSO.
Following the occurrence of any contingency c ≥ 1,
the set of available control actions corresponds to
the re-dispatch of the generating units that were
operational in the pre-contingency state.
(ii) We restrict to considering that the set Nb comprises
solely of two elements, corresponding to the working
and failing behaviors of corrective control respec-
tively. Under the latter, corrective control would be
completely ineffectual. In such a case, all controllable
resources (i.e. dispatchable generating units) would
remain at their preventive operating points.
(iii) Following from approximation (ii), the realization of
the corrective control failing behavior under the case
of a generating unit outage would result in a net
energy deficit. In such a case, we seek for a terminal
system state, as in approximation (v), by considering
that the transmission network remains intact.
(iv) Also following from approximation (ii), the realiza-
tion of the corrective control failing behavior under
the case of a line outage may result in overloading
additional network branches. In such a case, prior to
identifying the terminal system state we model the
removal of such branches from service.
(v) Under both line and generating unit outages, we seek
for a feasible terminal system state following the
realization of corrective control behavior b ∈ Nb by
means of the following emergency control actions:
– Shedding load across any network node.
6In this formulation all typical OPF constraints, such as static
load-flow equations, control feasibility ranges, etc., are incorporated
in the description of the set of admissible joint strategies U(x0).
5– Allowing generating units to ramp-down within
a limited range in response to the load shedding.
We note that in the case that the corrective
control failing behavior was realized, this limited
range is applicable with respect to the preventive
operating points of all generating units that were
not affected by the initiating contingency.
– Imposing that in case a generating unit cannot
operate within the aforementioned limited range
it would be disconnected from the network.
(vi) Following the application of the emergency control
actions listed in approximation (v) we adopt a linear
severity function to express the societal cost of the
service disruption. In this function we employ a load-
specific per unit free (in e/MWh) to denote the
cost incurred by any electricity consumer subject to a
service interruption. With regard to generating units,
we do not consider any emergency control cost in
the event that they are merely forced to ramp-down
within the aforementioned limited range. We recall
that function (4) explicitly accounts for the costs of
the preventive and corrective dispatch under every
credible system state. As such, we restrict to consid-
ering a unit specific fixed fee (in e) in the event that
a generating unit has to be disconnected in order to
reach a feasible terminal state. Such fee would reflect
not only the shut-down cost of a generating unit
but also the fact that the unexpected disconnection
may disrupt the unit’s planned operating schedule
for the subsequent periods due to minimum down-
time restrictions. Evidently, the level of this fee would
depend both on the technical characteristics of every
generating unit (i.e. capacity, flexibility etc.) as well
as on its connection point to the network.
(vii) Given that through (3) and (4) the present formula-
tion explicitly controls the severity arising from the
realization of any contingency c ∈ Nc and every
possible post-contingency corrective control behavior
b ∈ Nb, we allow for the relaxation of the post-
contingency transmission capacity limits under the
corrective control working behavior. In the event that
such limits have been relaxed at the optimal solution,
we model the consequences of such a decision as
described in approximation (iv), i.e. we remove the
overloaded branches from service prior to seeking for
a feasible terminal state.
The effect of all such approximations on the findings of this
paper, as well as the potential for reconsideration will be
discussed in detail at the final parts of this paper.
III. Mathematical Formulation
In the present section we introduce the detailed form of the
security management problem under consideration. We
note that problem (7)-(41) can be cast as a Mixed-Integer
Linear Programming Problem (MILP) by employing the
linearization technique detailed in appendix A.
min
∑
g∈Ng
cg · P 0g +
∑
c∈Nc\1
pic · crg
(
P cg − P 0g
)
+
∑
c∈Nc\1
pic ·
∑
b∈Nb
pib · sc(b)
 (7)
subject to,
for all nodes n ∈ Nn:∑
g∈Gn
P 0g −
∑
`∈N`
βn,` · f0` =
∑
d∈Dn
P 0d (8)
for all lines ` ∈ N`
f0` −
1
X`
∑
n∈Nn
βn,` · θ0n = 0 (9)
f0` ≤ fmax` (10)
− f0` ≤ fmax` (11)
for all generators g ∈ Ng
P 0g ≤ Pmaxg (12)
− P 0g ≤ −Pming (13)
for all nodes n ∈ Nn, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and
corrective control working behavior:∑
g∈Gn
P cg −
∑
`∈N`
βn,` · f c` (b) =
∑
d∈Dn
P 0d (14)
for all nodes n ∈ Nn, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and
corrective control failing behavior:∑
g∈Gn
acg · P 0g −
∑
`∈N`
βn,` · f c` (b) + δcn(b) =
∑
d∈Dn
P 0d
(15)
δcn(b)− τc ·
∑
g∈Gn
(P cg − P 0g ) = 0 (16)
for all lines ` ∈ N`, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and all
corrective control behaviors b ∈ Nb:
f c` (b)−
ac`
X`
∑
n∈Nn
βn,` · θcn(b) = 0 (17)
f c` (b)− ac` · λc`(b) ·M ≤ ac` · fmax` (18)
− f c` (b)− ac` · λc`(b) ·M ≤ ac` · fmax` (19)
f c` (b)− pc`(b) ·M ≤ 0 (20)
− f c` (b)− (1− pc`(b)) ·M ≤ 0 (21)
λc`(b)−
f c` (b)
fmax` + ε
− (1− pc`(b)) ·M ≤ 0 (22)
λc`(b) +
f c` (b)
fmax` + ε
− pc`(b) ·M ≤ 0 (23)
6for all generators g ∈ Ng and all contingencies c ∈
Nc
P cg ≤ acg · Pmaxg (24)
− P cg ≤ −acg · Pming (25)
P cg − acg · P 0g ≤ acg · P+g (26)
acg · P 0g − P cg ≤ acg · P−g (27)
for all nodes n ∈ Nn, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and all
corrective control behaviors b ∈ Nb:∑
g∈Gn
Pˆ cg (b)−
∑
`∈N`
βn,` · fˆ c` (b)−
∑
d∈Dn
Pˆ cd (b) = 0 (28)
for all lines ` ∈ N`, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and
corrective control working behavior:
fˆ c` (b)−
ac` · (1− λc`(b))
X`
∑
n∈Nn
βn,` · θˆcn(b) = 0 (29)
fˆ c` (b)− ac` · (1− λc`(b)) · fmax` ≤ 0 (30)
− fˆ c` (b)− ac` · (1− λc`(b)) · fmax` ≤ 0 (31)
for all lines ` ∈ N`, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and
corrective control failing behavior:
fˆ c` (b)−
ac` · (1− τc · λc`(b))
X`
∑
n∈Nn
βn,` · θˆcn(b) = 0
(32)
fˆ c` (b)− ac` · (1− τc · λc`(b)) · fmax` ≤ 0 (33)
− fˆ c` (b)− ac` · (1− τc · λc`(b)) · fmax` ≤ 0 (34)
for all demands d ∈ Nn, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and
corrective control behaviors b ∈ Nb:
Pˆ cd (b) ≤ P 0d (35)
for all generators g ∈ Ng, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and
corrective control working behavior:
Pˆ cg (b)−
(
1− ycg(b)
) · P cg ≤ 0 (36)
− Pˆ cg (b) +
(
1− ycg(b)
) · (P cg − acg ·∆P eg ) ≤ 0 (37)
for all generators g ∈ Ng, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and
corrective control failing behavior:
Pˆ cg (b)− acg ·
(
1− ycg(b)
) · P 0g ≤ 0 (38)
− Pˆ cg (b) + acg ·
(
1− ycg(b)
) · (P 0g −∆P eg ) ≤ 0 (39)
for all generators g ∈ Ng, all contingencies c ∈ Nc and
corrective control behaviors b ∈ Nb :
− Pˆ cg (b) + acg ·
(
1− ycg(b)
) · Pming ≤ 0 (40)
for all contingencies c ∈ Nc and corrective control
behaviors b ∈ Nb :
− sc(b) +
∑
d∈Nd
vd · (P 0d − Pˆ cd (b)) +
∑
g∈Ng
wg · ycg(b) ≤ 0
(41)
sc(b)− γc(b) ·M ≤ smax (42)∑
c∈Nc
pic ·
∑
b∈Nb
pib · γc(b) ≤  (43)
The first term in (7) expresses the cost of the preventive
generation schedule while the second denotes the expected
cost of the corrective re-dispatch. The third term is the
expectation of the severity function. We underline that the
form of the first two terms of (7) depends on the applicable
regulatory framework. Without loss in generality, through
function (7) we consider the case wherein a TSO seeks
to minimize the expected net generation cost under any
credible event. The extension of this work to alternative
regulatory arrangements, e.g. in the case wherein the TSO
is accountable for the cost of changes with respect to the
outcome of an already settled market clearing, remains
straightforward (see appendix B).
The pre-contingency nodal power balance is enforced via
equality (8). Expressions (9) to (11) correspond to the
DC power flow approximation and line capacity limits
in the pre-contingency state respectively. Moreover, the
feasible operating region of the generating units in the pre-
contingency state is expressed by (12)-(13).
The post-contingency nodal power balance is expressed
through (14) and (15). The former holds for the case that
there is no failure in the corrective control, hence the
equality is strictly enforced. We underline that, in case the
contingency relates to the outage of a generating unit, the
ineffectiveness of the corrective re-dispatch would result in
an energy mismatch. To account for this effect in (15), we
introduce a free slack variable (δcn(b)) per node. Equality
(16) defines the value of such slack variable with the use
of auxiliary binary parameter τc, which would only take a
value of 1 for a generator outage.
The DC power flow approximation in the post-contingency
states is expressed by (17). Binary variable λc`(b) is used in
(18) and (19) to allow for the relaxation of the line capacity
limits. To achieve that this variable would only take a
value of one when the capacity limits are exceeded, logical
constraints (20) through (23) are used7. More specifically,
(20) - (21) enforce that the value of binary variable pc`(b)
would be equal to one if the flow is positive (zero if the flow
is negative). In the former case, (22) imposes that binary
variable λc`(b) can only be equal to one if the flow is (at
least infinitesimally) greater than the corresponding limit,
while (23) is inactive. Conversely, in the case that the sign
of f c` (b) is negative, (23) takes force to ensure that a non-
zero value of binary variable λc`(b) indicates an overload
while (22) is inactive.
7Symbol ε denotes an infinitesimally small constant.
7The feasible operating region of the generating units in
the post- contingency states is expressed via (24)-(27).
Coupling constraints (26) and (27) are used to consider
ramping restrictions.
In order to quantify the severity of the system state, we
seek for a feasible power flow solution following the real-
ization of the effects of corrective control behavior. More
specifically, expression (28) re-establishes the nodal power
balance constraint. Furthermore, (29)-(34) impose that
overloaded network branches would be disconnected8. We
note that the products of binary and continuous variables
appearing in (29)-(34) can be linearized according to the
methodology presented in appendix A.
The set of admissible emergency control actions is mod-
eled via (35)-(40). Inequality (35) allows the use of load
shedding as a measure of last resort. Constraints (36)
through (39) impose that the generating units should
either only ramp-down within a limited range (following
the shedding of load) or be disconnected from the net-
work. More specifically, (36) and (37) apply in the case
wherein corrective control has been effective. In such a
case, the emergency ramp-down limit would apply with
respect to the post-contingency dispatch of any generating
unit. Alternatively, in the case that corrective control has
proven ineffectual, the limit is applicable with respect to
any unit’s preventive dispatch, as in (38) and (39). In both
cases, if a generating unit has to ramp down beyond the
admissible limit, binary variable ycg(b) would take a value
of one to denote the disconnection of this unit9. Likewise,
(40) expresses the minimum stable generation restriction
which remains valid.
Taking these measures used to reach a terminal state
into account, the severity of the system state is expressed
as in (41). The first term of (41) gathers the value of
the load that cannot be served. As already mentioned,
through the second term, we consider a fixed cost in
the case that a generating unit has to be disconnected
from the network. We recall that, parameter wg essentially
denotes the importance of ensuring the continuity in the
connection of unit g to the network. Such parameter would
be unit specific and depend not only on the capacity
of the unit but also on its location in the network and
its flexibility characteristics. Finally, inequalities (42) and
(43) impose the chance constraint on the severity level
through the use of auxiliary binary variable γc(b).
IV. Single-Area Case Study
In the interest of establishing the novel features of the
proposed approach we begin by discussing a set of demon-
8We should clarify that auxiliary binary parameter τc is used in
(32)-(34) to maintain all network branches in service in the case that
corrective control failed following a generator outage. This is due to
the fact that, as explained earlier, in such a case the nodal power
balance in the post-contingency state (15) can only be achieved by
introducing a set of slack variables.
9The linearization of products of binary and continuous variables
in (36) and (37) is presented in Appendix A as well.
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Fig. 2. Three-node, three-generator system
TABLE I
Generating Units Specifications
g
cg crg P
min
g P
max
g MTTF wg
(e/MWh) ( MW ) (h) (e)
1 20 5 10 100 500 4000
2 40 8 10 100 500 4000
3 30 7 10 50 250 4000
strative case studies based on the 3-bus network of figure
2. Table I summarizes the parameters of the 3 generating
units10. All network branches are assumed to have a
maximum capacity of 55 MW, equal admittance and a
mean time to failure of 10000 h, as in [15]. The demand
at node 3 is assumed to be equal to 100 MW for a
period of 1 hour, while the value of lost load is set at
e300/MWh.
We underline that for the purposes of these demonstrative
cases studies and without loss in generality, both the value
of lost load (vd) as well as the generating units’ disconnec-
tion severity coefficients (wg) have been arbitrarily set. In
the interest of signifying the value of maintaining service
to the network users, the former was set an order of
magnitude greater than the per unit generation costs in
the test system. Recalling that the latter should reflect
costs incurred at the period of disconnection as well as
the criticality of disrupting the availability of supply for
the forthcoming periods, a considerably large value was
selected. The critical role of such parameters on the per-
formance of the proposed approach, as well as the necessity
of establishing credible reference values, will be discussed
in detail at the concluding parts of this paper.
The set of credible failures considered in this example
involves the failure of any single component. The proba-
bilities of all credible contingencies, including the pseudo-
contingency of no failure, have been calculated according
to [16] and are listed in table II. Following the occurrence
of any contigency, we assume that the probability of
realization of the corrective control working behavior is
10For the sake of simplicity, ramping restrictions have been omitted
in this example.
8TABLE II
Contingency Set
c Event pic
1 No Outage 0.99193
2 Line 1 Outage 0.9 · 10−4
3 Line 2 Outage 0.9 · 10−4
4 Line 3 Outage 0.9 · 10−4
5 Gen. 1 Outage 1.9 · 10−3
6 Gen. 2 Outage 1.9 · 10−3
7 Gen. 3 Outage 4 · 10−3
TABLE III
Case A: Preventive Dispatch (MW )
g 1 2 3
77.5 10 12.5
0.8.
A. Case A: The ‘hidden’ severity levels of the N-1 ap-
proach
In order to establish a benchmark for comparison, we begin
by presenting the sequence of preventive and corrective
actions under the N-1 approach. This sequence has been
identified by simplifying the formulation presented in sec-
tion III in the following ways:
• The third term of (7) has been omitted.
• A sufficiently large admissible severity threshold,
making constraints (42)-(43) ineffectual, has been
selected.
• All constraints referring to the corrective control
working behavior have been strictly enforced, while all
constraints referring to the corrective control failing
behavior can be relaxed.
Owing to these simplifications, decision making in case
A follows the assumption that corrective control is fully
reliable. Nevertheless, the effects of the possible failure
of corrective control, as well as the resulting severity
levels are computed as by-products of the optimization
process.
The preventive generation schedule as well as the cor-
rective re-dispatch under any credible contingency are
TABLE IV
Case A: Corrective Re-dispatch (MW )
c \ g 1 2 3
2 55 10 35
3 45 10 45
4 45 10 45
5 x 50 50
6 82.5 x 17.5
7 65 35 x
TABLE V
Case A: Power Flows under Corrective Control Failure
(MW )
c \ ` 1 2 3
2 x 77.5 10
3 77.5 x 87.5
4 -10 87.5 x
TABLE VI
Case A: Severity Levels
c 2 3 4 5 6 7
sc(b) (e) 27250 34250 34250 23250 3000 3750
sc(b) (%) 64.88 81.55 81.55 55.36 7.14 8.92
pic · pib · 10−4 0.18 0.18 0.18 3.8 3.8 8
presented in tables III and IV respectively. Evidently,
under the corrective control working behavior the system
expected severity is zero since there exists a combination
of preventive and corrective actions to serve the demand
under any contingency. Nevertheless, it is also evident
that the sequence of actions listed in tables III and IV
is not resilient against the possibility that the corrective
re-dispatch may not materialize.
In fact, for generating unit outages the occurrence of an
energy deficit would be inevitable. Acknowledging that
all line outages (c = 2, . . . , 4) would require re-dispatch
actions (by inspecting table III and rows 1-3 of table IV)
we can identify that network capacity ratings would be
exceeded in case corrective control failed to take effect.
Indeed, this is confirmed in table V, wherein the line flow
patterns under the corrective control failing behavior are
presented for these contingencies.
Table VI presents the potential severity levels (first row)
along with the corresponding probabilities of realization
(third row). As an example, figure 3 illustrates the po-
tential effect of corrective control failure following contin-
gency 3. In such a case, the failure of corrective control
would result in overloading both network branches that
were not affected by the initiating contingency. Acknowl-
edging that these overloaded branches would be subse-
quently taken out of service, all 3 network nodes would
eventually be isolated. Consequently, generating units 1
and 2 would have to be disconnected due to minimum
stable generation restrictions. Moreover, given that con-
trollability of generating unit 3 is assumed to be lost,
the maximum available generation to serve the demand
is 12.5MW , i.e. the pre-contingency output of unit 3. As
a result 87.5MW of demand would have to be shed for a
period of 1 hour.
Noting that the maximum possible severity level in the
present example is equal to e42000 (in the case that
all units are disconnected and none of the demand is
served) the second row of table VI presents a relative
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Fig. 3. Failure of Corrective Control under Outage of Line 2
comparison. We should conclude by stating that the cost
of the preventive generation schedule in this case is e2325
while the expected cost of the corrective redispatch is
e0.55. Relative to the latter figure, the expected severity
level of e14.7 appears non-negligible.
B. Case B: Acknowledging the Severity of Corrective Con-
trol Potential Failure
The second case study serves to demonstrate the effect of
considering the potential failure of corrective control via
controlling the system severity levels. To that end, we now
consider the complete formulation presented in section
III. For the sake of consistency, we begin by maintaining
from case A the constraint that the line capacity limits
should not be relaxed under the corrective control working
behavior. The potential relaxation of these capacity limits
will be investigated at a subsequent part of this case
study.
The admissible severity threshold is set at 33% (1/3) of
the largest possible severity value, i.e. smax = 14000 e. We
begin by considering this threshold as a hard constraint by
setting the upper bound on the severity violation proba-
bility to zero. The effect of chance constraint (42)-(43) on
the severity threshold violation will also be demonstrated
at a following part of this case study.
Tables VII and VIII present the preventive dispatch and
corrective re-dispatch. In comparison to case A (tables III
and IV) we can identify that the corrective re-dispatch
remains unaltered. This was anticipated given the fact that
in case A, the severity levels under the corrective control
working behavior were equal to zero for all contingencies.
Likewise as expected, the difference between cases A and
B lies in the preventive schedule. The preventive schedule
implemented in case B comes at an increased cost since
generating unit 3 is now displacing cheaper unit 1.
Such cost increase comes at the benefit of ensuring that
the severity level is always below the desirable threshold,
even under the potential failure of corrective control. In
order to achieve this requirement, the selected preventive
TABLE VII
Case B: Preventive Dispatch (MW )
g 1 2 3
45 10 45
TABLE VIII
Case B: Corrective Re-dispatch (MW )
c \ g 1 2 3
2 55 10 35
3 45 10 45
4 45 10 45
5 x 50 50
6 82.5 x 17.5
7 65 35 x
TABLE IX
Case B: Power Flows under Corrective Control Failure
(MW )
c \ ` 1 2 3
2 x 45 10
3 45 x 55
4 -10 55 x
dispatch is feasible under all line outages, table IX. Given
this fact, it is noteworthy that a corrective re-dispatch has
also been selected. This is due to the fact that in case the
corrective control does not fail to have an effect, the re-
dispatch would generate a cost reduction. In this sense,
the secure preventive dispatch serves as a fall-back for the
case that corrective control is ineffectual. As a result, the
severity under corrective control failure for all line outages
has been eliminated, table X. Nevertheless, the energy mis-
matches arising from generation outages when corrective
control is ineffectual can only be counteracted by means of
emergency load shedding. As such, the severity levels for
all generating unit outages remain non-zero. On average,
these levels are lower than case A though.
Finally, in table XI we compare the preventive and ex-
pected corrective costs, as well as the expected severity
levels between cases A and B. As anticipated, the preven-
tive cost of case B is greater than that of case A. It should
be noted that this cost increase is asymmetrical to the
reduction of the expected severity level. This asymmetry
serves to demonstrate the conceptual difference between
the monetary and non-monetary costs of power system
TABLE X
Case B: Severity Levels
c 2 3 4 5 6 7
sc(b) (e) 0 0 0 13500 3000 13500
sc(b) (%) 0 0 0 32.14 7.14 32.14
pic · pib · 10−4 0.18 0.18 0.18 3.8 3.8 8
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TABLE XI
Comparison of Cost Components (e)
Preventive Cost E{Corrective Cost} E{Severity}
Case A 2325 0.55 14.7
Case B 2650 0.03 9.3
TABLE XII
Comparison of Alternative Chance Levels
P 0g (MW)
 \ g 1 2 3
1 45 10 45
2 77.5 10 12.5
security. We recall that in the present case, the admissible
severity threshold was considered as a hard constraint.
Owing to the fact that the severity target was thus
prioritized, the system operational costs became a less
critical factor in the decision making process and were
consequently increased.
On the Utility of the Probabilistic Chance Constraint:
As cases A and B have exemplified, security management
involves trade-offs between monetary and societal costs.
We recall that in case A, a smaller operational cost was
achieved at the expense of neglecting the (low-probability)
likelihood of very high severity levels. Arbitrating between
high consequence, lower probability situations and the
corresponding security costs has thus far been implicit
under the N-1 criterion. The present case study serves to
demonstrate that the proposal of this paper allows for an
explicit arbitrage between these factors.
To that end, we reconsider the example of figure 2 under
two different upper bounds on the severity violation proba-
bility. A value of 1 = 10−5, i.e. lower than the probability
of realization of the high severity levels of case A, and a
value of 2 = 10−2. As table XII demonstrates, the solution
to the former case corresponds to the solution of case B.
This is due to the fact that the probability of realization
of the combination of contingencies and corrective control
behaviors is greater than the upper bound on the severity
violation probability. As such, the potential severity levels
for these system states are to be controlled. Likewise, the
solution to the case where 2 = 10−2 is the solution of
case A since the severity threshold can be violated with
a probability greater than the probability of realization of
these states. In this manner, the present formulation allows
for selecting the set of events against which the system
should be protected by quantifying the relative costs and
benefits.
On Relaxing the Line Capacity Limits: As a final point
for consideration in this set of case studies, we return
to the fact that the proposal of this paper allows for a
relaxation of the post-contingency line capacity limits. The
TABLE XIII
Case B: Preventive Dispatch with Potential Capacity Limit
Relaxation (MW )
g 1 2 3
45 10 45
TABLE XIV
Case B: Corrective Re-dispatch with Potential Capacity
Limit Relaxation (MW )
c \ g 1 2 3
2 55 10 35
3 45 10 45
4 45 10 45
5 x 50 50
6 82.5 x 17.5
7 65 35 x
sole criterion for allowing or prohibiting such a decision
remains the resulting societal cost. This property has been
demonstrated between cases A11 and B. In the former, line
capacity limits under the corrective control failing behav-
ior have been relaxed at the optimal solution. This was
a result of the fact that the corresponding severity levels
were admissible according to the respective threshold and
violation probability upper bound. As in the latter this
was not the case, line capacity limits in the corrective
control failing behavior were not relaxed at the optimal
solution.
In order to exemplify the efficiency of this approach with
clarity, we conclude by presenting the solution to case
B when the line capacity limits are allowed to relax
even under the corrective control working behavior, tables
XIII and XIV. As these tables demonstrate, this solution
is identical to the initial solution of case B, since the
relaxation these limits at the optimal solution would result
in non-admissible severity levels. The fact that the iden-
tification of the conditions under which these limits can
be relaxed is efficient, justifies the consideration of this
additional degree of freedom to the decision maker.
V. Multi-Area Case Study
In the second set of case studies, we focus on the stakes of
implementing the proposed approach across several areas
of an interconnected power system. The scope of these
case studies is to identify the combined effects of different
security management practices on all end-users, located in
different control areas of the system.
To that end, we consider the six-node, two area system
presented in figure 4. Area A comprises nodes (1-3) while
nodes (4-6) form area B. The specifications of the 5 gen-
erating units are presented in tables XV and XVI. Table
XVII lists the maximum capacity of the transmission lines,
11We recall that this case is identical to the full formulation when
the maximum admissible severity level has a considerably large value.
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Fig. 4. Six-node, two area system
TABLE XV
Generating Units Technical Characteristics
g
Pming P
max
g P
−
g P
+
g ∆P eg MTTF
( MW) h)
1 10 100 40 40 5 500
2 10 100 20 40 5 500
3 10 50 40 40 5 250
4 100 10 40 40 5 250
5 40 5 20 20 5 250
TABLE XVI
Generating Units Cost Data
g
cg crg wg
(e/MWh) (e)
1 20 5 2500
2 40 8 2500
3 30 7 2500
4 65 10 4000
5 50 8 4000
which are again assumed to have an equal admittance and
a mean time to failure of 10000 hours. Finally, table XVIII
shows the allocation of the severity coefficients across the
two areas of the system. As this table indicates, area A is
assumed to be of lower per unit severity (both in terms
of shedding load and disconnecting generating units) with
respect to area B.
TABLE XVII
Transmission Capacity (MW )
` fmax`
1 65
2 – 7 55
8 65
TABLE XVIII
Severity Coefficients
Area vd (e/MWh) wg (e)
A 150 2500{d = 1} {g ∈ [1, 3]}
B 300 4000{d = 2} {g ∈ [4, 5]}
TABLE XIX
System-wide Security Management Severity Levels(e)
N-1 Approach
Event Total Area A Area B
Line 1/Control Fail. 19750 13750 (69.6%) 6000 (30.4%)
Line 2/Control Fail. 16750 16750 0
Line 3/Control Fail. 19750 13750 (69.6%) 6000 (30.4%)
Gen 1/Control Fail. 14250 14250 0
Gen 2/Control Fail. 3750 3750 0
Gen 3/Control Fail. 1500 1500 0
Gen 4/Control Fail 750 750 0
Severity Controlled Approach
Event Total Area A Area B
Gen 1/Control Fail. 8250 8250 0
Gen 2/Control Fail. 6750 6750 0
Gen 3/Control Fail. 6750 6750 0
Gen 4/Control Fail. 1500 1500 0
Gen 5/Control Fail. 750 750 0
A. System-wide Security Management
In order to set a basis for comparison, we begin by
considering that both areas are under the control of a
common operator. In this context, we compare the effect
of the proposed severity controlled approach against the
N-1 across the two system areas. The set of credible
contingencies includes the single failure of any system
component. As in the previous section, we assume that
the probability of corrective control failure is equal to 0.2.
The admissible severity threshold is set at 25% of the
maximum severity across both areas (i.e. smax = 12125
e). Finally, we consider this threshold as a hard constraint
by setting the respective violation probability allowance to
zero.
Table XIX analytically compares the potential severity
levels between the N-1 and the proposed severity con-
trolled approach12. As anticipated, the potential severity
levels are greater under the N-1 approach. The allocation
of the potential severity levels between the two areas is
also of interest. Under the severity controlled approach,
impacts to the end-users are always restricted within the
low per unit severity area (area A). Nevertheless, this is
not the case for the N-1 approach. We recall that under
the N-1 approach the potential failure of corrective control
is completely neglected. As such, there exist possible
combinations of preventive control actions and corrective
12For the sake of the presentation simplicity, only events with non-
zero severity values are henceforth listed.
12
TABLE XX
System-wide Optimal Power Flow (MW )
P 01 P
0
2 P
0
3 P
0
4 P
0
5
100 10 35 10 5
control behaviors under which service disruption within
the high per unit severity area is inevitable.
B. Area-wide Security Management
In the present subsection we consider the case wherein
the two interconnected areas A and B are under the
responsibility of different operators. Moreover, we consider
that the operator of area A follows the proposed severity
controlled approach while the operator of area B follows
the N-1 practice. In the former occasion, the admissible
severity threshold is set at 25% of the maximum severity
within area A and the violation probability allowance is
once again equal to zero.
In order to evaluate the minimum system wide severity
levels we adopt the following process:
• We consider two separate security management sub-
problems concerning areas A and B. In both cases,
the respective operator can only apply preventive
and corrective actions (and face the associated costs)
within its area of interest. Moreover, the set of cred-
ible contingencies involves any single failure within
the area under the responsibility of the respective
operator as well as the failure of any single area
interconnector.
• Given that the solution of subsection 2.1 only covers
single failures, we assume that the occurrence of
a contingency outside of the respective operator’s
control area is not a credible event. As such, we set
the operating point of the generating units in the
area outside the control of the respective operator
according to the solution of an OPF concerning the
two-area interconnected system, table XX.
• Within the security management subproblem of oper-
ator A (adopting the severity controlled approach) we
take into account the fact that it’s jurisdiction does
not extend outside area A. On this basis, we prevent
the relaxation of any constraints within area B under
any possible system state.
• Within the security management subproblem of op-
erator B (adopting the N-1 approach) we take into
account the fact that the neglected potential failure
of corrective control may cause constraint violations
within area A as well.
• Following the solution of subproblems concerning ar-
eas A and B we merge all identified corrective and
preventive decisions and seek to minimize the net
severity level across both areas under any credible
state by means of emergency control actions.
TABLE XXI
Preventive Dispatch Comparison (MW )
Control P 01 P 02 P 03 P 04 P 05
System 55 45 45 10 5
Area A 60 70 45 10 5
TABLE XXII
Severity Levels (e)
Severity Controlled Approach in Area A
Event Total (e) Area A Area B
Gen 1/Control Fail. 18000 0 18000
Gen 2/Control Fail. 19500 1500 18000
Gen 3/Control Fail. 4500 0 4500
Line 1/Control Fail. 20500 2500 18000
1) Severity Controlled Approach within Area A: The scope
of operator A is to optimize the value of (7) while main-
taining the potential severity levels within area A below
e5625 (i.e. 25% of the maximum possible severity within
area A). By inspecting rows 8-10 of table XIX, which con-
cern contingencies within area A, we can identify that the
system wide security management strategy fails to achieve
this target. We underline that all concerned instances are
under the failure of corrective control. As such, operator
A should seek for an alternative preventive dispatch to
restrict the impact of these events. As demonstrated in
table XXI, the preventive actions selected by operator A
differ with respect to the case where the severity controlled
approach is implemented across both system areas.
Evidently, the change in the preventive dispatch also
gives rise to a change in the corrective re-dispatch. Table
XXII demonstrates the optimal severity levels from the
perspective of area A operator. We note that rows 1-3
of XXII correspond to rows 8-10 of table XIX. All these
events concern the failure of corrective control following
the occurrence of a generating unit outage. The corre-
sponding non-zero severity levels of these events denote the
necessity of emergency load shedding across the system.
In the present case, transmission network constraints are
not restrictive to impose whether load should be shed
within area A or area B to alleviate the mismatch. Under
these conditions, from the perspective of operator A, the
acceptable solution would be to transfer the impact of the
energy mismatch to area B, by prioritizing the disruption
of the demand connected at node 5.
In order to exemplify the values listed in the last row of
XXII, we present in figure 5 the network configuration
following the outage of line 1 and the failure of corrective
control. We recall, that in such an occasion all generating
units would remain at the operating points listed in the
second row of table XXI. Consequently, the 60 MW of
injection at node 1 would result in the overload of line 2,
which has a maximum capacity limit of 55 MW. The loss of
this line would result in an deficit of 60 MW. Considering,
once again that such a deficit can be alleviated by shedding
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Fig. 5. Failure of Corrective Control under Outage of Line 1
TABLE XXIII
Minimum System-wide Severity Levels (e)
Event Total Area A Area B
Line 1/Control Fail. 11500 11500 0
Gen 1/Control Fail. 9000 9000 0
Gen 2/Control Fail. 10500 10500 0
Gen 3/Control Fail. 2250 2250 0
Gen 4/Control Fail. 1500 1500 0
Gen 5/Control Fail. 750 750 0
the load at node 5 operator A deems this event acceptable.
In the event that the load at node 5 is shed, the sole impact
in area A would be the disconnection of unit 1 at a severity
of e2500.
2) N-1 Approach within Area B: For the sake of complete-
ness, we briefly discuss the adoption of the N-1 approach
within area B. By inspecting table XV we can identify
that the minimum stable restrictions of generating units 4
and 5 prohibit any reconsideration of the operating points
listed in table XX. Considering the network topology
(figure 4) as well as the line capacity limitations (table
XVII), such operating point is feasible under any single
line outage within area B, as well as the outage of any
single interconnector. As a result, the N-1 approach in
area B would only involve corrective actions in the case
any one of the two generating units trips.
3) The Combined Effect of the Different Security Manage-
ment Practices: We conclude by assessing the combined
effect of implementing different security management ap-
proaches in the two areas of the interconnected system of
figure 4. For this purpose, we re-compute the system-wide
optimal severity levels in the case where the preventive and
corrective strategies for areas A and B have been identified
according to the severity controlled approach and the N-1
approach respectively.
As table XXIII demonstrates, in order to minimize the
system-wide severity levels the impact of any event should
be once again restricted within area A. We highlight
the fact that the potential severity levels in area A are
TABLE XXIV
Area A Security Management Costs (e)
Control Preventive Cost E{Corrective Cost} E{Severity}
System 4250.5 -1.58 12.44
Area A 4450 -0.318 10.88
considerably greater with respect to the values listed in
table XIX. Evidently, this is due to the fact that the
actual criticalities of the end-users located at area B where
completely neglected by area A operator under the severity
controlled approach.
Table XXIV presents a comparison of the cost breakdown
in area A between the case wherein the severity controlled
approach was adopted in both areas of the interconnected
system and the case where the severity controlled approach
was adopted only in area A. Recalling that the need to
control the severity under corrective control failure drives
the operator towards more expensive preventive control
strategies justifies the observed increased in the preventive
cost. In the system-wide case a larger severity threshold
was available to the operator. We observe once again from
table XIX that such large threshold allowed the severity in
area A to reach values above 25% of the maximum possible
area A severity. As in the case where severity control is
only implemented in area A the 25% of the maximum area
severity must be enforced, a more conservative, hence more
expensive, preventive dispatch has been selected.
In both cases, the negative terms related to the expected
corrective control costs highlight the push toward the more
conservative preventive control strategies. These negative
terms denote that the preventive schedules are so con-
servative that if a failure indeed triggers the operation
of corrective control system costs can be reduced. We
should finally clarify the origin in the observed reduction
in the expected severity value. Even though the severity
levels listed in table XXIII exceed those of table XIX,
the considerable reduction in case that corrective control
has failed following the outage of unit 3, along with the
relatively large probability of realization of this event, lead
to a reduced expected value.
Table XXV introduces a similar comparison for Area B. As
already noted, the preventive dispatch remains unaltered
in the case that area B follows the N-1 approach and
the case where the severity controlled approach is imple-
mented in the two system areas. Moreover, in both cases
the potential severity levels would be equal to zero since
the impact of any event would be directed toward the lower
(per unit) severity area A. The increase in the expected
corrective costs in the system-wide severity controlled case
arises from the fact that generating units in area B are re-
dispatched to counteract contingencies in area A.
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TABLE XXV
Area B Security Management Costs (e)
Control Preventive Cost E{Corrective Cost} E{Severity}
System 900 1.165 0
Area B 900 0.47 0
VI. Concluding Remarks
The N-1 practice has been pivotal to the secure operation
of electrical power systems. On the core of this approach,
lies a rigid attitude with regard to the uncertainties
in power system operation. Events that are considered
sufficiently likely (i.e. the outage of any single system
component) are to be treated as threats to the system
security whereas every other event is to be neglected. The
vast experience from the operation of power systems to
date has exemplified the resilience of this approach in
the case the degree of uncertainty is relatively minor.
Nevertheless, even under such case, the rare examples
where this approach failed to protect the system have
resulted in severe consequences to its end-users. This is due
to the fact that the N-1 approach inherently disregards the
difference in the risk levels between the different possible
system operating points [17].
Nowadays, the growth of uncertainties is a well-
acknowledged fact amongst the members of the power
system community. To cater for this fact under the N-1
framework in an efficient manner, more and more correc-
tive control measures have to be adopted. The increasing
adoption of such measures may not fully warrant the
security of modern power systems though. Understanding
the behavior of corrective control and, most importantly,
characterizing the uncertainties induced by its operation
appear as preconditions to this task. In a different case, the
use of corrective control measures would introduce hidden
threats of potentially high consequences to the system
security.
Considering these facts, in the present paper we investi-
gated the utility of an alternative probabilistic security
management approach. This approach departs from the N-
1 practice in the following key aspects: i) the probability of
realization of any credible system state is explicitly taken
into account, ii) corrective control outcome is considered
as an additional source of uncertainty in the system op-
eration, iii) the potential consequences resulting from any
combination of contingencies and corrective control out-
come, both in terms of operational costs to the TSO and
in terms of service end-users’ interruption costs, serve as a
criterion for the treatment of possible events as threats to
be counteracted and iv) the possibility of inducing severe
consequences to the end-users is explicitly controlled, by
means of a probabilistic chance constraint.
We would like to stress that the proposed probabilistic
framework is a proper generalisation of various determin-
istic (preventive/corrective) SCOPF formulations used for
security management in practice, in the sense that one
can obtain these latter by setting smax and  to zero, by
leaving out the expected cost of service interruption from
the objective function, and by assuming particular choices
of the corrective control behaviors. We also remark that,
while this framework is designed as a tool for designing
optimal combined preventive and corrective control strate-
gies for real-time operation, it may as well be used as
a tool for evaluating any other (partially or completely
specified) alternative control strategy by translating it in
the form of additional (hard, or possibly soft) constraints
and incorporating these latter into the RTP formulation.
These two characteristics enable, in particular, a fair com-
parison of the current deterministic security management
criteria with the proposed probabilistic one, which is a
necessary condition for gaining acceptance and enabling
the migration in real-world practice.
Section III furthermore provides a detailed mathematical
formulation of the proposed framework, under the DC ap-
proximation and some additional simplifying assumptions,
yielding a MILP problem which can be efficiently solved
with available tools, even for large-scale systems.
A. Main Findings
Albeit remaining at the proof-of-concept level, the initial
findings of this work (demonstrated by example in sections
IV and V) clearly establish the interest of pursuing this
research direction.
The single-area case studies analyzed in section IV have,
first and foremost, unveiled the limitations in the scope
of the N-1 approach. In contrast, these case studies have
demonstrated the greater potential of a probabilistic,
severity controlled approach. By means of this analysis,
we have established that the proposed approach is in
principle efficient in arbitrating between the operational
costs of security provision and the potential consequences
of service interruption to the system end-users. Moreover,
we have shown the fitness of achieving a probabilistic
guarantee with respect to mitigating high consequence
threats of low likelihood. Not to be neglected, the outcome
of these case studies accords to the inevitable truth:
achieving an enhanced security level comes at (possibly,
dis-proportionally) greater monetary costs. It thus appears
of critical importance to consider both factors in order to
develop an efficient security management strategy.
The multi-area case studies of section V considered the
effect of adopting two different security management prac-
tices within two sub-areas of an interconnected system.
The findings of these case studies serve to raise the need
for conformity in the practices adopted by TSOs within
an interconnected system. We have demonstrated that
without such conformity, a single TSO may fail to achieve
the severity related targets within his own area of interest
even in the case wherein his individual policy appears
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effective in doing so. Given that the technical intercon-
nection remains a physical reality, a ‘myopic’ perspective
within a sub-area of the system may well be counter-
productive. It follows that the efficient implementation of
such a framework calls for additional information exchange
amongst the TSOs in an interconnected system. As this
case study exemplified, in order to make sound decisions,
any single TSO must be accurately informed on the factors
driving emergency control (i.e. range of controllability
and criticalities of service disruption) in the system areas
outside its jurisdiction.
B. Open Issues
The present work serves to establish the interest in migrat-
ing from the N-1 practice toward a probabilistic security
management approach. We thus conclude by discussing
a series of issues that remain open in the direction of
realizing such a transition.
1) Characterizing the Behavior of Corrective Control: The
unpredictability in the behavior of corrective control was
adopted as a starting point for this work. Given the role of
corrective control, even in today’s power system security
management, characterizing the behavior of this resource
with high accuracy would be of critical importance. In
the context of the proposal of this paper, further research
would be required to identify an exhaustive set including
all the possible failing behaviors of corrective control.
Evidently, associating a credible probability value to any
such failing behavior is also essential.
In addition to developing such a set, special care is re-
quired in order to accurately model the operation of emer-
gency control. The scope for this activity would be to re-
flect all the dynamic phenomena occurring in subsequence
to the realization of any possible corrective control failing
behavior. We underline that achieving a high degree of ac-
curacy while preserving the computational tractability of
the decision making problem is a non-trivial task. With the
intention of concentrating on the fundamental principles of
the proposed security management practice in this work,
less emphasis was placed thus far on the former. Given the
criticality of this point on the proposed decision making
framework, in the next stage of this research we will seek
to identify an optimal trade-off between computational
tractability and modeling accuracy.
2) Quantifying the Societal Cost of Service Interruptions:
Evaluating the utility received by the electricity consumers
has been an active field of research within the social
sciences community (see, e.g. [18], [19]). Needless to say,
this field lies well outside the scope of any engineering
study. Be that as it may, we take this opportunity to
highlight the gravity of this point in completing the migra-
tion from the N-1 approach to novel security management
strategies.
In the development stages of this work, we identified an
additional societal cost component related to the loss of
generating units from the system. As presented in the
earlier parts of this paper, for the purposes of security
management in real-time, this cost component should
encapsulate the effect of the loss of any generating unit on
the continuity of supply further than the period of interest.
Having established in this paper the scope for considering
such a factor in the decision making process, we thus raise
the necessity of accurately quantifying this value.
As already mentioned, the quantitative results presented
in this paper are not based on validated reference values
for the aforementioned cost components. To the best of
the authors’ comprehension, this remains in complete ac-
cordance with the purpose of establishing the fundamental
properties of the proposed framework.
3) Developing Tractable Solution Algorithms for Large-
Scale Power Systems: In parallel to the issues discussed
in the preceding paragraphs, we should re-state that the
exact solution of the optimization problem considered in
this paper in large-scale power systems is a challenging
task in terms of computational complexity. In the next
steps of this work we intend to consider:
• Re-casting the problem under consideration in the AC
power flow context. In this context, we aim not only to
enhance the representation of the system behavior but
also to extend the set of potential corrective control
actions beyond the set adopted in the development
of the present work. Recent works from the applied
mathematics community, providing admissible convex
relations of the AC OPF may show to be useful in this
context [20].
• Defining approximations of the cost function (4) on
the basis of the scenario tree approach from the multi-
stage stochastic programming literature [21].
• Replacing the chance constraint (3) by an appropriate
number of hard constraints defined over a sample of
scenarios drawn according to the probabilistic model
of our problem, building on the recent results given
in [22], [23].
• Identifying a well-chosen subset of the combinations
of contingencies and behaviors that have to be taken
into account as credible events in order to warrant the
system security level. We note that the starting point
for the formulation of such a subset extends beyond
the set of events considered under the N-1 approach
(i.e. the failure of any single system component) to
encapsulate all the possible events according to the
vulnerability of the system components.
• Evaluating the performance of the proposed frame-
work on a large-scale power system with respect to the
N-1 approach, as implemented in today’s practice by
TSOs. To that end, we will exclude the consideration
of the probability of occurrence of the various credible
contingencies from the model of the N-1 approach.
4) Extension to Alternative Decision Making Horizons: As
a final point, we return to the multi-stage nature of the
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power system security management problem. The consid-
eration of the latest decision stage in this work, serves as a
first step toward developing a coherent approach across the
full set of the overlapping decision making horizons.
To that end, we suggest to gradually extend this research
by working backwards, from real-time to intraday and
day-ahead operation planning, then maintenance manage-
ment, then system expansion. Notice that by doing so the
space of uncertainties to be modelled and the space of
decisions to be jointly optimised will have to be gradually
expanded.
In particular, as soon as we reach the operation plan-
ning stage, one major additional source of uncertainty
to be accounted for are the power injections assumed
from renewable generation, demand, and market driven
dispatchable generation units.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the Belgian Network DYSCO,
an Interuniversity Attraction Poles Programme initiated
by the Belgian State, Science Policy Office. The authors
are also most grateful to Florin Capitanescu for his useful
discussions and suggestions.
Appendix A
The present appendix outlines the linearization of prod-
ucts of binary and continuous variables appearing in the
formulation presented in section III. More specifically,
equalities (29) and (32) involve products of binary variable
λc`(b) and free continuous variable θˆcn(b) as in,
fˆ c` (b)−
ac` · (1− λc`(b))
X`
∑
n∈Nn
βn,` · θˆcn(b) = 0 (44)
fˆ c` (b)−
ac` · (1− τc · λc`(b))
X`
∑
n∈Nn
βn,` · θˆcn(b) = 0. (45)
The product λc`(b)·θˆcn(b) can be replaced by free continuous
variable θ˜cn(b) via the following set of constraints:
θ˜cn(b) ≤ λc`(b) ·M (46)
θ˜cn(b) ≥ −λc`(b) ·M (47)
θ˜cn(b)− θˆcn(b) ≤ (1− λc`(b)) ·M (48)
θ˜cn(b)− θˆcn(b) ≥ (λc`(b)− 1) ·M. (49)
Inequalities (36) through (39) involve products of bi-
nary variable ycg(b) and non-negative continuous variables
P 0g , P
c
g as in,
Pˆ cg (b)−
(
1− ycg(b)
) · P cg ≤ 0 (50)
− Pˆ cg (b) +
(
1− ycg(b)
) · (P cg − acg ·∆P eg ) ≤ 0 (51)
Pˆ cg (b)− acg ·
(
1− ycg(b)
) · P 0g ≤ 0 (52)
− Pˆ cg (b) + acg ·
(
1− ycg(b)
) · (P 0g −∆P eg ) ≤ 0. (53)
The product ycg(b) · P 0g can be replaced by non-negative
continuous variable P˜ 0g ≥ 0 through13:
P˜ 0g ≤ ycg(b) ·M (54)
P˜ 0g − P 0g ≤
(
1− ycg(b)
) ·M (55)
P˜ 0g − P 0g ≥
(
ycg(b)− 1
) ·M. (56)
Appendix B
The MILP formulation of (7)-(43) may be extended in
a straightforward way to piece-wise linear costs functions
instead of the objective (7). In the present appendix we
explain how this may be exploited to adopt a different
objective function, according to an incremental settlement
of preventive and/or corrective control costs.
Preventive Control Adjustment Cost
In some regulatory jurisdictions, a TSO would only be
liable for the cost of deviations with respect to the outcome
of an already settled market clearing, denoted henceforth
as PMg for every unit g ∈ Ng. In order to model this,
in the general case wherein different fees are applicable to
upwards or downwards changes, the first term of (7) would
be modified in the following way:
C0(x0, u0) =
(∑
g
cg · PMg +
∑
g
cg · PMg
)
, (57)
where symbols cg and cg denote the per unit costs of up-
wards and downwards deviations respectively and:
P
M
g = max
{(
P 0g − PMg
)
, 0
}
(58)
PMg = max
{(
PMg − P 0g
)
, 0
}
. (59)
The expression of (58) and (59) in a linear form can be
made by the use of a set of logical constraints. We also
notice that the case wherein deviations are remunerated
according to an absolute value (i.e. |PMg − P 0g |) is a
particular case of (57)-(59) where c = cg.
Corrective Control Adjustment Cost
A commonly used alternative for the costs of corrective
control penalises any modification against the preventive
schedule. In a similar manner to (57)-(59), this can be
integrated in the MILP of (7)-(43) via:
Cc(x0, u0, c, uc) =
(∑
g
crg · P
c
g +
∑
g
crg · P cg
)
, (60)
where symbols crg and crg denote the per unit costs of incre-
mental/decremental deviations respectively, while:
P
c
g = max
{(
P cg − P 0g
)
, 0
}
(61)
P cg = max
{(
P 0g − P cg
)
, 0
}
. (62)
13The same process is applied to replace the product ycg(b) ·P cg by
non-negative continuous variable P˜ cg ≥ 0.
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